State, Space, and the Sources of Social Power: Reflections on Michael Mann and Henri Lefebvre

In many respects, Michael Mann and Henri Lefebvre make an odd couple. Mann is a well-established British historical sociologist who has been based at the University of California, Los Angeles since 1987. Mann’s work focuses on the historical emergence of macro-level societal phenomenon, such as state power, war, empire, globalization and ethnic cleansing; the four volumes of his magisterial Sources of Social Power (ambitiously attempt to explain the history of global social order from the Neolithic era to the present day. Given his appetite for analysis on the grandest of scales, Mann’s intellectual project sits more comfortably alongside the work of classical rather than contemporary sociologists. The scale of his vision has even led one scholar to describe Mann as ‘our generation’s Max Weber’. Like Weber, Mann has pioneered new typologies and approaches for understanding the social world. Most notably, his distinction between infrastructural and despotic state power, as well as his version of multi-causal relationalism, have been widely adopted in empirical work by Anglophone historical sociologists and, more recently, political scientists.

Lefebvre, in contrast, occupies a liminal position in these two disciplines. Between the late 1940s and the 1980s, he worked prolifically on the edges of numerous debates: philosophy, urban planning, Marxism, structuralism, social routines and rhythms, and the critique of everyday life. Although largely overlooked by Anglo-American sociology and political science, Lefebvre’s novel insights into the socio-

political constitution of space have proven profoundly influential amongst human geographers\(^1\) as well as scholars of critical international relations and political economy.\(^2\) This impact became pronounced following the English translation\(^3\) of Lefebvre’s *La Production de l’espace* (1974). Best known as a theorist of space, Lefebvre’s musings on the state have only recently, and as yet incompletely, started to reach the Anglophone world. Despite recent English versions of extracts from this work,\(^4\) Lefebvre’s four-volume work *De l’État*\(^5\) remains untranslated. In a further sign of the times, it is out of print in France, his home country. Despite his cult appeal among enthusiasts - one of whom has described him as ‘the leading spatial theoretician in Western Marxism and the most forceful advocate for the reassertion of space in critical social theory’\(^6\) - Lefebvre’s work appears marginal to the macro-level concerns of mainstream Anglo-American historical sociologists such as Mann.

In this essay, I want to reverse this trend by bringing Lefebvre’s spatial insights to bear on Mann’s account of the modern state. Mann’s thinking has arguably reached its mature expression in last year’s publication of the final two volumes of his *Sources of Social Power*.\(^7\) Here, Mann interprets the historical development of human society in reference to his fourfold model of Ideological, Economic, Military and Political power (IEMP). Denying ultimate causal primacy to any one of these factors, Mann\(^8\) instead proposes that it is the semi-autonomous developments, network interactions, and contingent configurations of these four types of power that provides the best framework to explain the global evolution of human civilization. Yet at the same time, Mann accords special status to the fourth element of his IEMP model, political power, which he identifies exclusively with the institutions of the state. As we shall see, Mann defines the state in explicitly territorial terms, thereby creating space for an interstitial encounter with Lefebvre’s very different approach to understanding the state – an approach that problematizes the spatial foundations upon which Mann’s account is constructed. I shall develop this point in the course of my essay. In outlining and juxtaposing the accounts of Mann and Lefebvre, I aim to highlight the potential of a constructive engagement between these two scholars. Mann and Lefebvre may belong to different disciplinary and methodological traditions, but I want to suggest that any incommensurability between ‘Anglo-Saxon empiricism’ and ‘French theory’ is stylistic rather than substantive. Historical sociological accounts of the modern state could benefit from considering and incorporating the implications of Lefebvre’s provocative comments regarding the production of state-space.

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My essay addresses three significant points of contact between Mann and Lefebvre. In the first part, I outline their theoretical conception of the state, which might reductively yet efficiently be characterised as territorialised in the case of Mann, but spatialised in the case of Lefebvre. In the second part, I explain how each of these two spatial frameworks produces very different perspectives when it comes to an empirical phenomenon of central concern to historical sociology: the rise of the modern state form from its beginnings in medieval Europe to its world diffusion in the age of colonialism and then to the current iteration of that process in the era of globalization. As I hope will become apparent, putting the work of Mann and Lefebvre into dialogue is neither an academic exercise to satisfy intellectual curiosity, nor a social scientific experiment to induce friction. While my suggestions in this essay are as yet preliminary, I would like to propose, albeit tentatively at this point, that this brief encounter between Anglo-American historical sociology and French Marxist social theory may help us apprehend with greater clarity the contours of the state debate that matter to us today in understanding the world in which we live.

1. Territory, Space and the Modern State

Mann’s work on the modern state was initially developed in the context of a drive to ‘bring the state back in’ to US sociology and comparative politics.24 The state that was thereby reintroduced quickly acquired the moniker of neo-Weberian, given its apparent intellectual debt to Weber’s25 classical definition that emphasized bureaucracy, territory, and the monopoly of legitimate violence. In the late 1970s and 1980s, Weber’s formulation allowed American academics to theorize the state in ways that did not simply reduce it to class conflict,26 capitalist functionalism,27 or pluralist interest groups,28 but that could instead take the state seriously as an assembly of institutions that existed as an organization potentially autonomous from society.

Mann’s most significant contribution to this debate specified that state autonomy could be manifested in two distinct forms: despotic and infrastructural power. Despotic power describes the ability of a sovereign state to impose its rule regardless of the will of the population. Mann29 memorably captures this idea with the image of the Red Queen from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, who screeches the sentence ‘off with his head’ to punish the slightest infractions from the terrified members of her court. Infrastructural power, in contrast, represents ‘the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implementlogically political decisions throughout the realm’.30 Unlike the colourful example of the Red Queen’s execution orders, infrastructural power operates in more mundane registers, such as tax papers, census data and identity documentation, which predispose society towards certain forms of regulation. These two forms of state power are involved in delivering the four common functions performed by states, to varying degrees, throughout their history: internal order; external defence/aggression; territorial infrastructure; and economic redistribution.31 However, Mann singles out

30 Ivi, p. 5.
31 Ivi, pp. 13-14.
territorial infrastructure for special treatment and identifies this territorial infrastructure as the most crucial precondition for state power:

Only the state is inherently centralized over a delimited territory over which it has authoritative power. Unlike, economic, ideological or military groups in civil society, the state elite’s resources radiate authoritatively outwards from a centre but stop at defined territorial boundaries. The state is indeed a place – both a central place and a unified territorial reach.32

It is the uniquely centralised and territorialized nature of the state and its functions, from pacification and defence to law-making and economic redistribution, that differentiates political power networks from alternative sources (i.e. ideological, economic, or military power) and generates the inherent tendency towards the state’s autonomy from society.33

Although this early work on the state suggested a zero-sum relationship between state and society, in the second volume of the Sources of Social Power Mann (1993) refined his model to state that the territorial organization and penetration of state power was not unidirectional: individual and collective social actors can use the same vectors to penetrate and colonize state institutions themselves. In keeping with his commitment to relationalism, not only are state and civil society mutually intertwined, but also the state itself is an open network rather than a coherent unitary actor.34 'The state is no longer a small, private central place and elite with its own rationality. “It” contains multiple institutions and tentacles sprawling from the center through its territories, even sometimes through transnational space'.35 Despite this acknowledgement, Mann defends his continued adherence to the territorial model of state power. Rather than retaining a narrow focus on the institutions of the state, Mann redirects attention to the functions performed by the state across diverse agencies. The state therefore draws on shifting coalitions of actors and institutions that vary according to the nature of the task in hand: ad hoc, functional networks, rather than fixed institutional arms. This flexibility gives rise to what Mann describes as the ‘polymorphous crystallization’ model of state power, to convey how the state crystallizes as ‘the’ centre for multiple power networks, without that centre necessarily being the same for each one. States might, for example, variously crystallize “capitalist, dynastic, party democratic, militarist, confederal, Lutheran, and so forth”,36 but these are overlapping tendencies rather than mutually exclusive elements in a typology. Importantly, the simultaneous presence of theoretically inconsistent tendencies (welfare policies and patriarchy, for example) may not signal state weakness or incoherence, but the successful accumulation of new “functional crystallizations”.37 Political (state) power is never wholly independent of Ideological, Economic or Military Power, but unfolds as it both acts and is acted upon in relation to these other networks. In this respect, the break that some commentators identify between Mann’s earlier and later work38 may be overstated: the ‘polymorphous crystallization’ of the state is largely a more explicit restatement of Mann’s underlying commitment to multi-causal explanation.

32 Ivi, p. 16.
33 Ivi, p. 29; M. MANN, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760: History of Power from the Beginning to AD.1760 v. 1, cit., pp. 26-27.
35 Ivi, p. 61.
36 Ivi, p. 76.
37 Ivi, p. 79.
and relationalism. Be that as it may, throughout his work Mann consistently and emphatically holds the distinguishing characteristic of the state to be its unique mode of territorial centralization, an organizational form that contains – or at least channels or funnels – the other functions of the state.

Lefebvre similarly attributes a central role to territoruality in the workings of state power. In Mann’s account, for functional, if not instrumental purposes the state imposes order on an expanse of territory that exists independently of any political organization. A recurrent theme in Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* (1991), by contrast, is that this territory is not naturally occurring, but an effect produced by state strategies that radically reshape how space is perceived, organised, and employed. Although these state strategies are often disguised by the convention that space is ontologically prior to social relations, Lefebvre argues that space is *produced* by hegemonic forces that organise, categorise, and employ space in a particular way, on the basis of a particular logic, and with the deployment of particular technologies and forms of expertise. Formulated in this way, the argument might seem to share common ground with Mann. Yet Lefebvre is here proposing more than the truism that the state’s characteristic organization of transport and communications (roads, rail, post, telegraph, internet), energy and resources (electricity, water, gas), administration (local, regional, national government) and extraction mechanisms (taxation, conscription) cumulatively serve to consolidate and deepen the identification of the state with the territory it occupies. Instead, Lefebvre posits the more radical claim that the territorial strategies of the state create and impose a form of spatiality that both serves the ends of the state and seeks the systematic annihilation of non-state spatial alternatives. Lefebvre bestows upon this new space produced by the state the name of ‘abstract space.’

Abstract space denotes a form of space that is measurable and quantifiable, possessed of physical dimensions that may be empirically ascertained and exhaustively mapped. It connotes a space from which ambiguity or social complication has been shorn: abstract space is regular, even and homogeneous, able to circulate from hand to hand, owner to owner, with all the smooth ease of a coin or a commodity in the marketplace. This is indeed the abstracted, almost mathematical space much beloved of high modernist urban planners and engineers, whose grand designs typically have little room for the everyday routines, social interactions and lived experiences that are so important to a meaningful human life. Abstract space seeks to eradicate this pre-existing social space wherever it is encountered.

For Lefebvre, the territorality of the state is one specific yet significant historical instance of abstract space. Yet, importantly, he denies that state strategies to produce this particular spatial form are ever entirely successful:

> «Abstract space is not homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its ‘lens’. And, indeed, it renders homogeneous. But in itself it is multiform. […] This to look upon abstract space as homogenous,’ suggests, ‘is to embrace a representation that takes the effect for the cause, and the goal for the reason why that goal is pursued. A representation which passes itself off as a concept, when it is merely an image, a mirror, and a mirage; and which instead of challenging, instead of refusing, merely reflects. And what does such a spectacular representation reflect? It reflects the result sought».40


40 Ivi, p. 287.
The argument here is not simply that the state projects the illusion of hegemonic success to disguise local resistance against statist forms of spatial regulation (though the everyday tactics and spatial practices of non-state actors create permanent and relentless, albeit sporadic and spontaneous possibilities for contestation). Echoing the language and symbolism of Marx’s discussion of the commodity, Lefebvre classifies the abstract space of the state as a curious species of fetish. Just as the commodification of labour into a seemingly natural, reified object conceals the relations of production that constitute it, so too does the ordering of abstract space obfuscate the violence and artifice that underpin its production. It is this artifice that projects the national space of territory as the ostensibly ‘natural’ form of the state, while diverting attention away from its equally important non-territorial dimensions. For Mann, political (state) power depends in the final analysis on its territorial form, yet Lefebvre’s rejects this position and insists on a strong version of the argument that space is a social rather than physical phenomenon. ‘Social spaces interpenetrate one another and/or superimpose themselves upon one another,’ Lefebvre writes. ‘They are not things, which have mutually delimiting boundaries and which collide because of their contours.’ Territory, from Lefebvre’s perspective, can neither ground nor circumscribe the spatial analysis of the state.

Neither the work of Mann nor Lefebvre lends itself to straightforward summary. Mann’s conceptual arguments are briefly outlined in places, but largely realised and embedded in his substantive empirical analysis; Lefebvre’s gloriously Nietzschean style of writing is patterned with imagery, rhetoric and allusion: even if his empirical material could be said to be philosophical, then here too Lefebvre dances over the distinction between theory and evidence. Although Mann’s theory of the state has been sketched in some detail, I have so far confined my comments on Lefebvre to the notion of the production of space, which hints at a major difference between the two scholars: Mann’s state theory is territorial, while that of Lefebvre is, as I shall detail, more accurately described as spatial. In the next section of the essay, I trace the implications of this divergence upon their narratives of state formation over the period from medieval Europe to the present day.

2. The Rise of The State: Europe, Colonialism, Globalization

Both Mann and Lefebvre subscribe to orthodox Eurocentric perspectives on the historical evolution of the modern state. According to this common narrative, the national state form originated in medieval Western Europe and subsequent expanded across the globe along vectors of colonial domination and post-colonial isomorphism. Consequently, the mainstream sociological narrative of the rise of the modern state becomes intimately intertwined with accounts of the emergence of capitalism and modernity. Although sharing this common conclusion, Mann and Lefebvre reach it via different routes.

Mann’s account of the rise of the state in early modern Europe sits comfortably alongside the ‘bellicist’ tradition of neo-Weberian historical sociology, which identifies the production of space, which hints at a major difference between the two scholars: Mann’s state theory is territorial, while that of Lefebvre is, as I shall detail, more accurately described as spatial. In the next section of the essay, I trace the implications of this divergence upon their narratives of state formation over the period from medieval Europe to the present day.

43. L. Stanek, Space as Concrete Abstraction: Hegel, Marx, and modern urbanism in Henri Lefebvre, in Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, cit.
44. H. Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Volume I, cit., pp. 86-87 (original emphasis).
warfare as the central process in state formation. This school maintains, in brief, that the institutions belonging to the state arose as a by-product of efforts by early rulers to expand their territories at the expense of neighbouring rivals and competitors. Tilly forcefully argues that the states most successful at warfare were those most capable of the extraction and mobilization of domestic resources (manpower, capital). The existential logic of inter-state military competition therefore drove the development of administrative systems of tax collection and other functions of civil government identified with the state. Although Mann’s IEMP model inures him against accusations of mono-causal explanation, his account nevertheless converges with that of the bellicists, especially in his earlier work. As we have seen, Mann’s accords territoriality a key position in his definition of the state; the geopolitical framework of military competition proposed by Tilly similarly conceptualizes the state, and the space of the state, in exclusively territorial terms.

Hobson has pointed out that the bellicist tradition in historical sociology corresponds to what scholars of International Relations would call structural neorealism. Implicit to this body of theory is the supposition that the internal characteristics of the state are subordinate to and determined by the exogenous constraints of the international system of states, which is a system of self-interested anarchy. As it posits that this system exist independently of the actions of individual states, which are powerless to interfere with or alter its rules, structural neorealism has been variously charged with ahistoricism, positivism, and political conservatism (or neo-conservatism, in the early 2000s). Nevertheless, Hobson identifies ‘an early “quasi-realist Mann” and a late “non-realist Mann”’, heralding Mann’s discussion of polymorphous crystallization and state territorialisation as a sign of this transition.

While this may be true in Mann’s discussion of state formation in late modern Europe (he notes that militaristic tendencies were overtaken by other forces by XXX), realism returns in full force in Mann’s discussion of colonialism and imperialism. ‘The proximate cause of European success [at conquering most of the planet] was superior military power,’ Mann argues, ‘not a higher level of civilization, scientific revolutions, or capitalism.’ Military power refers here not simply to more advanced technology, but to the more efficient organization and deployment of military capabilities developed from the experience of centuries of internecine warfare on the battlefields of Europe. Following Bartlett, Mann also describes state formation, competition and expansion through warfare within Europe as essentially no different from the processes of imperial expansion: from 950 to 1350 AD in Europe, the ‘more politically organized and militarized core [of advanced states] swallowed up the periphery’. Having re-described state formation in early modern Europe as colonialism, Mann opens the door to
understanding subsequent European colonialism in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the Americas as an extension of this same logic. More importantly for our purposes here, Mann’s territorial definition of the state establishes space as a physical substance that can be internalized and incorporated by the omnivorous European states as it devours new lands. In practice, of course, the geometries of this process were variable: the direct assimilation of colonized territories, such as France’s incorporation of Algeria, was rare. Colonial state formation was mediated by networks of power that were variously economic (free trade, developmentalism), ideological (racism, culturalism), and political (civilising mission, white man’s burden). My point here is simply that, in Mann’s account, the impetus for the trans-oceanic expansion of European polities and population is the same territorial logic of militarism that propelled the original processes of state formation. In the twentieth century, the continuation of this bellicist logic, albeit mediated by other factors and adopted by other polities, was largely responsible for two world wars. ‘Imperialism within Europe had changed seamlessly into imperialism across the globe; in Europe war had for many centuries resorted to when negotiations were viewed (quite early) as failing. Japan [in WWII] then imitated Europe, partly because it felt that its own autonomous survival depended on imperialism’. If Mann’s multi-causal reading of history tends to give the leading edge to military rather than ideological, economic, or political power, it does so in ways that involve a resolutely territorial understanding of space. In much the same way, in the final volume of Sources of Social Power, Mann sees globalization as a series of processes – more accurately termed globalization – whereby the ideological, economic, military and political networks of power are stretched across ever wider distances. Significantly, extending the territorial reach of these networks implies a quantitative shift in scale – a jump to the next level of geography, if you like - rather than a fundamental remaking or reconstitution of scale. In Mann’s work it is territory, not space, which remains the defining dimension in which state building, colonialism, and globalization unfold.

What difference would it make to perceive state-space in its non-territorial dimensions? Lefebvre’s work offers hints at a possible answer. His account of state formation begins, like that of Mann, in Europe and in violence; yet here the driving force is the violence of capital accumulation, not inter-state military competition. Echoing Marx, Lefebvre relies on extra-capitalist practices of violence to provide the spark that leads to the explosion of capitalism. Lefebvre’s analogy (if that is the right word) between space and capital means that primitive accumulation also produces the big bang that leads to new expanding universe of abstract space. In Lefebvre’s analysis, it is the state that channels the violent annihilation of pre-existing social space:

[The state] aggressed all of nature, imposing laws upon it and carving it up administratively according to criteria quite alien to the initial characteristics of either land or its inhabitants. At the same time, too, violence enthroned a specific rationality, that of accumulation, that of the bureaucracy and the army – a unitary, logistical, operational and quantifying rationality which would make economic growth possible and draw strength from that growth for its own expansion to the point where it would take possession of the whole planet. A founding violence, and continuous creation by violent means [...] – such are the hallmarks of the state.

55 Ivi, pp. xix–xx.
56 Ivi, p. 564.
58 H. LEFEBVRE, The Production of Space, cit., p. 281.
In underlining Marx’s insistence that war is not merely a destructive force, at times Lefebvre foreshadows the later conclusions of bellicist historical sociologists. ‘What did war produce?’ Lefebvre\(^{59}\) asks, before answering his own question. ‘The answer is: Western Europe – the space of history, of accumulation, of investment, and the basis of the imperialism by means of which the economic sphere would eventually come into its own.’ But unlike Tilly or Mann, who see economics as a set of resources that may be marshalled by political power (albeit that various configurations of these resources have differential and relational impacts: the social and infrastructural structures necessary to extract the economic resources embedded in coal, for example, are very different from the structures required to tap the riches produced by alluvial agriculture), Lefebvre attributes capital with its own unique logic, a logic which is generative of different modalities of space. While one of these modalities is the homogenous, abstract territoriality produced by the national state, Lefebvre highlights that this is not the only form of state-space. Instead, he observes that different forms of space are complex and intertwined, ‘polyscopic’ and plural,\(^{60}\) rather than contradictory, binary, or mutually exclusive.

The implication here is that the state is neither threatened nor compromised, but partially (or even substantially) constituted by the emergence of non-national, non-territorial spaces. This point becomes especially salient in debates on globalization, which are still arguing the toss over whether or not state power is on the decline as a result of the growth of supra-state institutions, non-state multinational actors, and domestic denationalizations across much of the world since the late 1970s. Lefebvre’s plural notion of space allows the global, international, national, regional, local, and urban levels to co-exist simultaneously, without necessarily effacing any other spatial form. Contemporary patterns of neoliberalism and globalization can therefore be seen as the reconfiguration, or respatialization, of the state, rather than its deterritorialization. This insight has proven particularly popular with critical Anglo-American geographers and international political economists, who have used Lefebvre’s writings as the theoretical scaffolding for work on contemporary urbanism, regional development, and the politics of scale.\(^{61}\) The sustained application of Lefebvre’s ideas to the colonial expansion of the state form, much less its development over the longue durée, has yet to be realised.\(^{62}\) Lefebvre himself has less to say about the mechanics of state formation outside the West, arguably leaving his account of the global vulnerable to accusations of a certain parochialism. Nevertheless, Lefebvre’s insistence on the multiple, scalar forms of state spatiality provides a useful point of departure for addressing the globalization debate in greater nuance.

3. Implications
In this essay I have sketched out Mann’s theory of the state and used Lefebvre’s spatial theory to suggest that *Sources of Social Power* adopts a territorial, rather than fully spatialized, analytical framework. Territoriality also provides the impetus for Mann’s

\(^{59}\) Ivi, p. 277.

\(^{60}\) Ivi, pp. 86-88 and 308.


account of colonial expansion as essentially a continuation of the war-making / state-making dynamic that developed in the heart of Western Europe. From this perspective, the territorial expansion of the state to the non-European world cannot help but be an imitation of the original. Lefebvre’s richer notion of the production of space, in contrast, provides grounds for a more flexible state theory, one that is surprisingly adept at accommodating the dramatic reconfigurations in state power that have been witnessed across much of the world since the 1970s. While Mann sees the diverse transformations bundled together under the moniker of globalization as merely the continuation and extension over longer distances of pre-existing ideological, economic, military and political networks of power, Lefebvre provides the tools to interrogate a fifth element, space. As both the medium and product of the processes that Mann describes in such detail, the contortions of space can warp the sources of social power in unanticipated and unacknowledged directions. Only by incorporating this spatial fabric into historical sociology can we appropriately map these new dimensions of social power.